There are three conventional arguments about the evolution of the Russian armed forces over the past decade. The first one is that despite numerous programs, concepts and highlevel statements, practically no Russian military reform has been achieved beyond managing day-to-day crises and military decline through restructuring. The second argument is that military restructuring not only failed to reinforce economic, political and social reforms in Russia, but only complicated or even undermined their progress. Finally, the third argument is that any foreign assistance in dealing with the economic and social consequences of failed military reform–beyond financial assistance with implementation of arms control agreements and decommissioning of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) stockpiles–could have only a marginal, if not counterproductive impact. However, there are exceptions to all three arguments, which should be taken into account when the next US administration undertakes a comprehensive policy review in the field of cooperative threat reduction assistance and military-to-military cooperation programs with Russia. […]
Memo #:
152
Series:
1
PDF:
PDF URL:
http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0152.pdf
Author [Non-member]:
Oksana Antonenko