The Non-Proliferation Treaty as a Conditional Norm

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is an explicitly discriminatory treaty. It enshrines the right of a handful of “Nuclear Weapons States” (NWS)—the five that had tested a nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967—to possess nuclear weapons, while categorically ruling out the right to their possession by all others, the “Non-Nuclear Weapons States” (NNWS), even if they do not join the treaty. This basic inequity is only slightly moderated by the treaty’s other provisions (e.g., articles VI and X, respectively, on atomic energy and withdrawal). Not least due to the NPT’s discriminatory character, scholars and expert observers began forecasting its imminent demise not long after its inception. However, despite the NPT’s highly publicized difficulties with recalcitrant member-states such as Iran, the basic fact is that nearly all the states in the world are members in good standing of this treaty. In addition to its near-universal state membership, it has been progressively strengthened over the years and has also overcome numerous serious shocks. Indeed, by most measures—the number of states that are party to it, the number of states that have left or violated its terms, or the indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995—the NPT is one of the most successful treaties of all time. But why? Our memo suggests an explanation for the NPT’s continuing strength that focuses on treatment of the NPT as a conditional norm. […]

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