The sudden collapse of Taliban power in Kabul and other cities in the north of Afghanistan, followed by the liberation of most of Afghanistan from Taliban control, happened much faster than expected in the United States and occurred while the administration was still debating the idea of including Taliban “moderates” in the new Afghan coalition government. The United States had never taken the Northern Alliance too seriously and was not very enthusiastic about it controlling, although largely formally, a substantial part of Afghanistan’s territory. Fully aware of the Pashtun factor as a key to any political settlement in Afghanistan, the United States has staked much not only on the Northern Alliance—or perhaps not even mainly on them—but also on the “nonextremist” Pashtuns, including what it saw or pretended to see as the “moderate” part of the Taliban. […]
Memo #:
230
Series:
1
PDF:
PDF URL:
http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0230.pdf