Interstate Relations, Perceptions, and Power Balance: Explaining China’s Policies Toward Ethnic Groups, 1949–1965

(Publication) Why do multi-ethnic states treat various ethnic groups differently? How do ethnic groups respond to these state policies? We argue that interstate relations and ethnic group perceptions about the relative strength of competing states are important—but neglected—factors in accounting for the variation in state-minority relations. In particular, whether an ethnic group is perceived as having an external patron matters a great deal for the host state's treatment of the group. If the external patron of the ethnic group is an enemy of the host state, then repression is likely. If it is an ally, then accommodation ensues. Given the existence of an external patron, an ethnic group's response to a host state's policies depends on the perceptions about the relative strength of the external patron vis-à-vis the host state and whether the support is originating from an enemy or an ally of the host state. In this article we are testing this theoretical framework on state-minority relations in the Chinese context. We present five configurations and elucidate our framework on the eighteen largest ethnic groups in China from 1949 to 1965, tracing the Chinese government's policies toward these groups, and examine how each group responded to these various nation-building policies.

According to the 2000 Chinese National census, there are fifty-six ethnic groups residing within the PRC. The Han Chinese core group comprises about 91.6 percent of China's population. Thus, there are 109 million non-Han Chinese comprising the remaining 8.4 percent of the population of China. The Chinese state explicitly proclaims itself to be a multi-ethnic state, having adopted the Soviet model of granting autonomy to ethnic groups and alternately permitting or sanctioning certain expressions of cultural diversity. In parallel, however, key elements of a European style nation-building project are still actively promoted by the Chinese state, as evidenced in efforts to impose a common language—Mandarin—and instill loyalty to the Chinese nation-state.

The Chinese Constitution of 1954 made provisions for autonomous government for various ethnic groups, following the Soviet model, but the Chinese model is distinct in that it excludes the right of secession for recognized ethnic minorities. At the same time, however, the Chinese state has been trying to integrate these ethnic minority peoples into the majority Han Chinese. We use the term “integration” because despite this institutionalized perpetuation of differences, the Chinese state is actively pursuing the transformation of the whole population into loyal Chinese citizens. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in particular its Han Chinese elites, considers itself as the most economically and culturally advanced entity in China and thus has a mission to “help” the more backward ethnic minority groups through teaching them the “Han Chinese way.” In recent years, this effort manifested itself through the gradual elimination of bilingual education programs, as well as through the encouragement of Han Chinese migration into ethnic minority regions to help the locals develop. China has followed all three policies—exclusion/repression, accommodation, and integration—toward different groups over time.

Moreover, different ethnic groups have followed different political strategies in response to Chinese nation-building policies. Some are more rebellious, such as the Tibetans and the Uyghurs. Yet other ethnic groups have sought either limited cultural autonomy or even assimilation—the Manchus are a case in point. Its multiple large non-core groups and the apparent contradictions in its nation-building policies render China an ideal case to study. There are important studies focusing on how China's domestic politics affect its strategic behavior in the international system. In this article, we focus on how interstate relations and power balance dynamics impact China's policies toward ethnic groups. In particular, we systematically examine the formative years of the PRC's nation-building process after its founding in 1949.

The structure of the article is as follows. First, we review existing arguments on majority-minority relations before offering our own theoretical framework. We then justify our case selection and present the basic characteristics of the various minority ethnic groups in China. In the third section, we provide an overview of the nation-building policies implemented by the CCP from 1949 to 1965, right before the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution represents a significant juncture in the history of the PRC. Mao dismantled the whole CCP party structure, and any sensitivity toward ethnic cultural expression was abandoned. The year 1965 was also when Tibet Autonomous Region was founded, symbolizing the consolidation of the PRC's territorial and political control over its periphery. In the fourth section, we evaluate our theoretical configurations against alternative explanations by looking in greater depth at the strategic interactions between the PRC and five ethnic groups over time. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the insights gained from studying Chinese nation-building for the literature on state-minority relations at large.

Co-authored by Harris Mylonas and Enze Han