It is reasonable to expect that NATO's war against Yugoslavia would produce obvious effects on Russian foreign policy. NATO's actions against Belgrade should have heightened Moscow's suspicion of the West–NATO and the United States in particular. Some might even argue that it has convinced Moscow that its worst fears about NATO expansion were true: it is a military alliance directed by the United States against Russia and its allies. Such conclusions, while not obviously misplaced, do obscure a more subtle and more profound set of effects NATO's actions have had on Russian foreign policy. Events in and around Kosovo did more than influence Russian policy; they have influenced Russia's understanding of itself and its national identity, and of the West, NATO and the United States. In this way, the effects of Kosovo are far more fundamental and enduring than merely producing a change in Russia's policy; it has contributed to the development of Russia's political identity. But this change is not necessarily captured by a scale of hostility and danger; instead, the change is one of difference and distance. Kosovo is associated with a continuing Russian drift toward an identity that is more Russian and less Western, more unique and less homogenous, more traditional and less modern. […]
Memo #:
81
Series:
1
PDF:
PDF URL:
http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0081.pdf