PONARS Eurasia Commentary by Maria Lipman and Nikolay Petrov with Vladimir Gel’man, Grigorii Golosov, Ben Noble, Gleb Pavlovsky, Andrey Pertsev, Ekaterina Schulmann, and Denis Volkov.
Although the experts interviewed here generally point out that the Russian parliamentary (Duma) elections next month will not be accompanied by any enormous surprises, some unexpected results may take place, especially at the regional level. One example may be in Khabarovsk, where the Kremlin is determined to have the unpopular Mikhail Degtyarev elected governor. Some other surprises may have started to materialize. For example, the Central Electoral Commission denied registration to the candidacy of well-known communist politician Pavel Grudinin claiming that he had off-shore assets, although there may be other reasons for sidelining him.
The opinions below, however, are divided about whether Russia’s regime has been undergoing a political transformation. Many do not consider the ongoing political changes as a transformation and prefer to see them as “adjustments” aimed at preserving the status quo or furthering authoritarian consolidation. Of those who tend to characterize the changes as a transformation, Nikolay Petrov, for example, says that the transformation of the institutional design has already taken place on paper and is at an early stage in real life. Gleb Pavlovsky, however, emphasizes that Russia has been in a state of transformation for over thirty years but has yet to reach even an intermediate development platform.
The differences among the experts are not merely terminological, and that the current political model of a “distanced online personalism” cannot be fully accounted for by reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic. We may be seeing a transition from a system headed by a ubiquitous “father of the nation” to a system of the father’s devotees and envoys. Some say that the current regime has reached the average survival age characteristic of a personalistic autocracy and is unlikely to survive President Vladimir Putin, its creator. Even though many see signs of crisis and operational failure, they believe that the Russian regime is resilient, has the capacity for adjustment, and will probably cope with emerging challenges. – Maria Lipman and Nikolay Petrov
Recommended: PONARS Eurasia Podcast: The Evolution of Russia’s Political Regime, June 21, 2021. Maria Lipman chats with Grigorii Golosov and Henry Hale about the evolution of Russia’s political regime in the lead-up to September’s Duma election.
What do you expect of the September elections?
In my view, the September 2021 State Duma elections are not the most decisive event in Russia or one that may determine its political trajectory for decades to come. Rather, the Kremlin considers these elections as a launching pad for the forthcoming 2024 presidential election (assuming that Putin is eager to run) and intends to preserve a super-majority of United Russia by all possible means. All the political machinery of the Russian state will be mobilized for the September elections, but the rising public discontent makes this target not too easy to meet.
Do you agree that Russia is undergoing a political transformation? If so, what is its short-term goal and, do you believe that this goal will be achieved?
Absolutely disagree. Rather, I would say that Russia’s authoritarian political regime looks consolidated, and the Kremlin aims to preserve the political status quo as long as possible, at any cost and using various means. As Adam Przeworski stated thirty years ago, “authoritarian equilibrium rests on lies, fear or economic prosperity.” What we observe now is the total elimination of the economic prosperity from the menu of options for Russia: thus, lies (propaganda) and, especially, fear (repressions) remain the Kremlin’s major tools. My understanding, at least for now, is that the goal of preserving the political status quo is feasible for the Kremlin, but the price of achieving this goal will steadily increase over time.
What are the current Russian regime’s long-term prospects?
Political scientists, including myself, are notoriously bad at long-term predictions: there are so many unknown variables (many of which remain latent) that even a correct forecast may be based on wrong assumptions. However, what we do know is that personalist authoritarian regimes (including the Russian one) are poorly institutionalized and rarely demonstrate continuity beyond the life cycle of their founders. They often become victims of intra-elite rivalry in various forms, and this rivalry does not necessarily result in democratization. Moreover, the longevity of autocrats in an office usually reduces the chances for successful democratization after their deaths. Whether or not Russia will be an exception from this rule remains to be seen.
What do you expect of the September elections?
The ability of Russia’s authorities to win elections rests on five pillars: 1. The effective elimination of credible opposition; 2. The niche or less-than-credible character of the allowed opposition parties; 3. The administrative mobilization of the voters; 4. Outright election fraud; and 5. Sincere support of Putin in some societal sectors. In the September 2021 elections, the fifth factor will be weaker than before, and the possible mobilization of opposition-minded voters (by means of the “smart vote” and/or other forms of social media campaigning for turnout) might counteract the second factor. But the remaining three will be reinforced. Therefore, I expect that United Russia will be able to win a plurality or a small majority of seats in the proportional part of elections; it will win a large majority of seats in the first-past-the-post section; the KPRF and the LDPR can take their continued representation in the Duma for granted; A Just Russia – For Truth will probably make it as well, but without certainty; other parties will take a small number of district seats, mostly when allowed (that is, when United Russia abstains from running). Overall, the results will be similar to those of 2016.
What are the current Russian regime’s prospects?
In brief, I think that Russia’s personalistic dictatorship in the form of electoral autocracy consolidates with a good prospect for long-term survival, contingent on Putin’s physical ability to stay in control)
What do you expect of the September elections?
The elections should be generally uneventful and produce a Duma that meets the Kremlin’s goals. The Kremlin has thoroughly purged the political scene from any unwanted figures; the government’s repressive policy toward political activists has worked to intimidate those who might be interested in joining campaigns as potential candidates or in other capacities. The government seeks to dampen the turnout: with hardly any campaign going on, many Russians are likely to stay home. Recent polls have shown that the Russian people’s interest in elections has progressively decreased over the past years. The Kremlin’s policy, in the meantime, will aim at bringing its habitually obedient voters to the polls, and this policy will surely succeed. Where this policy is not enough, various manipulations and rigging will do the trick.
Do you agree that Russia is undergoing a political transformation? If so, what is its short-term goal and, do you believe that this goal will be achieved?
I wouldn’t refer to it as a transformation. The Russian political regime invariably aims at keeping the status quo. It is a “movable status-quo,” one in a state of permanent adjustment and readjustment. Over the years, the Kremlin has honed to perfection this technique of ongoing patching and mending. What makes this technique especially effective is that the public at large is also in favor of a status-quo and is good at adjusting to declining living standards. Russians are generally apprehensive of political change, which, in the public mind, is bound to make things worse, not better. It is true that the regime is facing increasingly tougher challenges, and political patching and mending come at a higher cost, but I can see no reason to expect that those in charge of adjustment will not cope with the new challenges.
What are the current Russian regime’s long-term prospects?
Political forecasting in Russia is a highly ungratifying job. What can be said is that the country is generally on the decline, economically and demographically, and this trend is unlikely to change in the conceivable future. Russia’s traditional pattern of the state’s dominance over the society will most surely stay in place, and the state is just as certain to ensure this dominance by authoritarian means. Just what particular political configuration will take shape in the years to come and what political figures will take the leading positions is impossible to tell at this point.
What do you expect of the September elections?
There will most probably be no upset for the Kremlin in September: it is highly likely that United Russia will re-secure a majority of seats, perhaps even a super-majority—and even with United Russia’s support currently hovering around 28 percent. The 8th convocation of the Duma is particularly important, given that it runs across the crucial 2024 presidential elections, meaning that the legislature needs to be relied upon as a source of stability in the political system. But the Kremlin has had to and will need to continue to expend considerable resources in securing this result, including an unprecedented crackdown on oppositional voices, as well as on independent, critical media. Claims of attempted “foreign interference” will also likely increase in an attempt to rally voters in support of the current leadership, even if they are concerned by factors like rising food prices.
Do you agree that Russia is undergoing a political transformation? If so, what is its short-term goal and, do you believe that this goal will be achieved?
Elements of the political system are indeed changing, but this is less a wholesale transformation and more the adaptations needed to continue to secure the status quo for the Kremlin. Rather than pursuing a forward-looking transformation, the ruling elite is treading water – but is needing to kick evermore vigorously to stay afloat. The costs of maintaining the status quo are rising.
What are the current Russian regime’s long-term prospects?
As a personalist autocracy, the current political regime in Russia lacks strong institutions that would help ease an orderly transition of power and allow Vladimir Putin to retire in peace. This key existential dilemma will continue to shape the ruling group’s actions. A pension-age ruling cohort is re-writing the rules – both constitutional and legal, including raising mandatory retirement ages for certain officials – to allow its members to remain in office, partly motivated by the fear of what might happen on retirement.
What do you expect of the September elections?
Russia is entering a final, turbulent phase of the transition of power. Anyone offering a political analysis should consider this context as a “coefficient of uncertainty.” The results of the September 19 Duma election are preordained by a stringent screening of candidates, as well as arrests and intimidations. However, the control over the election procedure is limited by a brittle balance at the top (the “highest circle” has been reduced to about 8 to 10 figures). The State Duma has become a valuable instrument—as a transmission mechanism of repressive signals, as well as the legislative ones, and as the scene of strife among the Kremlin powerhouses, such as Vyacheslav Volodin, Mikhail Mishustin, and Sergey Kirienko. The machine of the voter mobilization has been honed to perfection, the way it was in 2018. Meanwhile, the support for United Russia has plummeted, and if it performs badly in the September election, other pro-Kremlin Duma parties cannot serve as a Kremlin’s safeguard. The Kremlin’s headquarters is torn between two goals: to raise the level of public support for the Kremlin and to avoid a strengthening of the Duma “opposition.” Domestic politics has become increasingly unmanageable.
Do you agree that Russia is undergoing a political transformation? If so, what is its short-term goal and, do you believe that this goal will be achieved?
The Russian Federation has been in a state of transformation over the past 30 years, and, so far, it has failed to reach an intermediary platform of development. Russia’s transition has been exacerbated by the goals of Putin’s own transition – his own and his inner circle. This creates a duality of goals which is further complicated by the behind-the-scene competition among the members of the president’s inner circle for places in the final roster.
Putin’s ostensibly single-handed decision-making is an illusion. This “cult of single-handedness” has increasingly gotten in the way of producing a general scenario of transition or a unified hierarchy of goals. A “successor” scenario is politically unfeasible since an attempt to transfer the load of the current president’s informal prerogatives to somebody else is inevitably fraught with conflict. Meanwhile, the “successor” scenario has in itself become Putin’s prerogative: his right to make this final, personal move is fully recognized. However, such a scenario lacks a political underpinning. There is instead a “cloud” of uncoordinated but conflicting goals, whose “codeword” is “the year 2024.” Meanwhile, one does not see political projects in progress with a 2024 deadline. The final scenario will be chosen and simultaneously implemented at a critically tight timeline. It will be a high-risk, improvised operation. The “dark horse” factor lies not in the emergence of previously unknown circumstances but in the likelihood of somebody in the inner circle coming up with a different endgame scenario. Such a turn of events may imply a radical, disruptive move aimed at spoiling other players’ games. The likelihood of such a development is rising with the growing uncertainty of Putin’s personal strategies.
What are the current Russian regime’s long-term prospects?
This question looks provocative—so far, not a single forecast of this sort has come true. The uncertainty is additionally deepened by the fact that the Russian Sistema is not just an authoritarian regime but one equipped with a super-advanced mechanism of adaptation to internal and global crises. This “no-rule adaptation” is guided by a top-priority goal of preserving Putin’s team, despite even the most catastrophic failures. This system is extremely flexible, but this flexibility comes at the cost of the undermined national development and disrupted nation-building. The Kremlin will undoubtedly undertake to infiltrate the new generational strata in order to corrupt them and disrupt their development. Whatever plan may be designed by Putin’s inner circle, it will be instantly discarded if it gets in the way of Putin’s own survival. It is impossible to know what instruments will be used in a critical situation like that, but they can get extremely radical (a “perestroika” scenario is ruled out; perestroika is taboo to Putin’s team). But a Stalin-style “revolution from above” or a military scenario cannot be ruled out.
What do you expect of the September elections?
United Russia will likely gain 50 or 60 percent of the vote on the party slates, and its candidates will win in about 200 single-mandate districts. This will ensure a super-constitutional majority for the UR. Given the three-day voting, I cannot imagine a different scenario. Even with its current rating of about 30 percent, the UR can gain over 50 percent of the vote just thanks to the administrative mobilization in the “electorally abnormal” regions. I won’t be surprised if it gains more than 60 percent. I see that the Presidential Administration is making every effort in order to lower the vote for the KPRF and push the Communists to the second position; the Kremlin is fairly likely to achieve this goal. The A Just Russia-For Truth is not sure to make it to the Duma. The incorporation of Zakhar Prilepin in this party generates conflicts, especially in regional branches, where A Just Russia’s positions are rather strong.
The main question is whether the elections will cause mass protests. Protests are impossible to predict, but the government will surely seek to prevent them at any cost. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, the authorities are obviously suppressing the turnout. There are virtually no signs of an ongoing campaign. Neither does state-controlled TV pay much attention to the upcoming elections. The party slates, including the new parties and the KPRF, are dull and unattractive. Besides, the authorities are doing their best to discredit the “smart voting” (“protest voting” appears to be a more apt description). On the other hand, the public discontent over a range of social problems (first and foremost, the rising prices) may generate public protests after the elections. If a large number of people join the protests, I am not sure that the authorities will resort to brutal means. In the case of large-scale protests (they are highly unlikely but not fully ruled out, in my opinion), the authorities might even dissolve the Duma since the candidates selected by the government are very weak.
Do you agree that Russia is undergoing a political transformation? If so, what is its short-term goal and, do you believe that this goal will be achieved?
Russia is hardly undergoing a political transformation; rather, the situation is getting harder. But the vertical of power itself (not sure how else to call it) is in deep crisis. As far as I know, since the president has distanced himself from decision-making, certain important decisions remain unmade, including some government appointments. It is hard to tell how long this situation may last. Some of the overdue appointments have been put off “until the fall” or even until later. Rotations of many positions (including the speaker of the Federation Council, the FSB, etc.) were expected: those who currently hold these offices are reportedly willing to move to “quieter” positions that would be more appropriate for their age, and there are also those who would like to replace them. However, these decisions have not been made. Aleksey Dyumin, the current governor of the Tula region, who was rumored to be picked as the next head of the FSB, stayed in his region instead. The Siberian federal district has been without a plenipotentiary envoy for several months. Groups of influence are displeased. In conversation with me, members of one such group referred to the current situation as “stagnation.” It is hard to say just how this discontent may evolve.
What are the current Russian regime’s long-term prospects?
The prospects of the current regime depend on a single factor, that is, the president’s health and, in principle, on his capacity to effectively resolve certain internal conflicts. These conflicts remain frozen for now, but more and more bubbles are appearing on the surface. Besides, in the case of grave public discontent, the system may find it reasonable to sacrifice the president himself. But this scenario implies too many assumptions.
What do you expect of the September elections?
Scylla and Charybdis, between which the authorities will have to pass, are the maximum absence of legal criticism of the government during the campaign and the preservation of 0-legitimacy, that is, its current level. To this end, it is necessary to avoid high-profile exposures, scandals, or protests in every possible way. I think the Kremlin will have to pay the price for the latter: those candidates who will get to the Duma, whether members of the three minority parties or those of United Russia, will be less amenable than those of the current, 7th convocation. It is important that the Kremlin will have to pay for “installing” a high share of “its” candidates in the Duma by weakening control over them; this is inevitable both because the share of the Communist Party will increase and its candidates are different, and because it has become more difficult to select “passable” UR candidates. This means that the next Duma will play a more independent role than the current one.
Do you agree that Russia is undergoing a political transformation? If so, what is its short-term goal and, do you believe that this goal will be achieved?
The political transformation in terms of updating the institutional design is almost complete. At the very top, the system looks like a multi-headed hydra. Its heads include two governmentsthe presidential government and the prime minister’s, as well as the Presidential Administration, the Security Council, the State Council, the Commission for the International Development Assistance (Dmitry Kozak’s), and the expanded VEB (Vneshekonombank) as a mega-institute of development. These heads are crowned with a common crown — President Putin. The problem, however, is that the new or updated institutions themselves, as well as the mechanisms of their interaction, are at the stage of formation and running-in, which is very far from complete. The goal of the transformation is to ensure the functioning of the system in an autopilot mode, without Putin’s daily participation in making managerial decisions but under his general control. This goal has already been partially implemented, but the resulting mechanism has to prove its efficiency in time for the presidential elections of 2024.
What are the current Russian regime’s long-term prospects?
The regime is resilient and has a large margin of safety. It is quite capable of remaining in place throughout the current and maybe the next presidential term, that is, until 2030. At the same time, if it does not change, it will face galloping economic problems after 2030, and its collapse is inevitable. It may collapse earlier as a result of increasing managerial inefficiency and growing economic problems, which may be aggravated by the weakness and incapacity of institutions, including the informal ones.
What do you expect of the September elections?
Something similar to what was going on around the 2019 election to the Moscow city assembly, with the exception of mass rallies that have been banned until the end of 2021. The turnout is going to be rather low, with a sizable share of those who will come to the polls “out of spite.” Pseudo-opposition parliamentary parties will benefit from the “spiteful vote,” and so will individual candidates representing small parties who will manage to get registered in single-mandate districts. The party of power will continue to control a simple majority in the Duma, and maybe even a constitutional majority, although this is less likely. A number of new, conspicuous deputies will appear in the Duma, who may be expected to make their job more public and to make the Duma seem more significant, yet without a noticeable impact on the end result of the lawmaking process. The votes cast on September 19 will mostly go to the opposition; all loyalists will cast their votes on the first two days of the three-day vote in accordance with the government authorities’ guidelines.
The electronic vote will be of mixed nature: it will be used by those whom their employers will force to cast their votes, as well as by younger voters in large urban centers. Rigging patterns will vary region to region: there will be less rigging in large urban centers, and election authorities in those regions will seek to make it less conspicuous. Meanwhile, the administrators in rural regions and in ethnic republics will engage in unbridled falsifications. The rigging is unlikely to provoke post-election protest rallies of a kind that broke out in 2011. The sense that “they have whipped it all up for themselves” will become more deeply rooted in the public mind than it was after the 2020 vote for the constitutional changes.
An important question to ask of foreign-policy experts is the likelihood of the United States and the European Union not recognizing the results of the 2021 Duma election. At this point, it looks unlikely. Besides, the large-scale pre-election effort aimed at barring unwanted candidates from the race may paradoxically reduce the risk of high-profile campaign scandals that might call into question the final distribution of the mandates.
On the whole, the 2021 elections are less important in themselves (despite the fact that the members of the Duma eighth convocation will witness and participate in significant political transitions) and more important as the first stage of the “major transition”—the main political process of the first half of the 2020s. This transition will have political as well as demographic aspects and will rely on various information, law enforcement, and financial means, as well as, probably, the military ones.
Do you agree that Russia is undergoing a political transformation? If so, what is its short-term goal and, do you believe that this goal will be achieved?
This “transformation” does not have an obvious goal, nor is it implemented according to any plan known to its implementers. It is an objectively determined socio-political process whose participants include those who deem themselves its operators and have a plan (or a variety of plans), as well as those who have never heard the word “transformation.”
At the core of the Russian transformation of the 2020s lies a gradual generational change and a transfer of power, assets, and property from the generation born in the 1950s to their children, or sometimes, to grandchildren. Not all such transfers will be successful, but where they are, the heirs’ values and behavioral practices will differ from those of their ancestors. Another factor that will define Russia’s development in the next decade is the dynamic of the hydrocarbons demand in the developed countries, the successes or failures of the “Green Turn,” and the related fluctuations of the Russian primary export commodities prices.
What are the current Russian regime’s long-term prospects?
Judging by the dates of Russia’s main strategic documents and the postponement of the implementation of national projects, the current political structure has the goal of lasting at least until 2030 (2024 plus 6 years). The leadership believes that in the time remaining until that date, it will be able to further strengthen the Russian Federation’s military capacity, as well as to create along Russia’s perimeter a “gray belt” consisting of unrecognized, semi-legal territories closed to the outer world, as well as to raise a new generation of civil servants and property owners to be appointed to various positions. It is to this generation that the current leadership plans “to hand over” Russia. To get an idea of how such a “handover” can be implemented, one might look at the management replacements in a few universities that took place over the past year and a half. The top position is filled by a relatively young and rather faceless “administrator” who has the experience of organizing public events and celebrations. He is assisted by a seasoned deputy specializing in security issues who makes sure that both the students and the professors behave properly and that everything going on in the university be transparent and well known to the management. Depending on one’s level of historical optimism, one can decide whether or not such a plan is realistic
What do you expect of the September elections?
I don’t expect any big surprises. Four parties are sure to win seats in the parliament based on the party slates vote. The “Communists of Russia” party might also overcome the five-percent hurdle. The New People and Yabloko parties are hardly likely to make it. But let us see how the campaign goes. One thing is certain: the Kremlin will keep the Duma under control.
Do you agree that Russia is undergoing a political transformation? If so, what is its short-term goal and, do you believe that this goal will be achieved?
I disagree with the term “transformation.” Some changes are indeed going on, but they can rather be described as the regime’s adaptation to the changing conditions (low economic growth, growing public discontent, etc.). The regime’s essential features remain unchanged. The stepped-up pressure on society is in line with the long-term trend; this trend has hardened as the public support for the regime has gotten weaker.
What are the current Russian regime’s long-term prospects?
The regime will permanently face problems, but for the time being, it will cope with them. The regime appears to be most vulnerable at the 10 to 15 years horizon when social and economic problems (demographic problems, declining demand for oil, etc.) will build up and overlap with an ongoing generational shift (the Soviet generations used to vote “as a matter of habit” or “as a matter of duty” will gradually pass away), and the time will come for a natural replacement of the supreme leader.
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