Debates regarding American implementation of a national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) systems designed to shoot down incoming nuclear missiles have so far focused on such issues as technical feasibility, cost, and the likely Russian reaction (for background bearing on the latter question see PONARS memos 108, 109, 132, and 134). It has largely been taken for granted that, if these obstacles could be overcome, implementation would be desirable. This memo examines that implicit premise. Simply put, assuming that implementation proves to be feasible, what is the strategic criterion that should be met in order for implementation to be desirable? To answer this question I must engage in a brief digression into the logic of defense and deterrence. […]
Memo #:
177
Series:
1
PDF:
PDF URL:
http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0177.pdf
Author [Non-member]:
Bear Braumoeller
